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Abstract 
The election of an Australian Labor Government in Australia in 2007 saw ‘social inclusion’ 
emerge as the official and overarching social policy agenda. Being ‘included’ was subsequently 
defined by the ALP Government as being able to ‘have the resources, opportunities and 
capabilities needed to learn, work, engage and have a voice’. Various researchers in Australia 
demonstrated an interest in social inclusion, as it enabled them to construct a multi-dimensional 
framework for measuring disadvantage. This research program resulted in various forms of 
statistical modelling based on some agreement about what it means to be included in society. 
The multi-dimensional approach taken by academic researchers, however, did not necessarily 
translate to a new model of social policy development or implementation. We argue that, similar 
to the experience of the UK, Australia’s social inclusion policy agenda was for the most part 
narrowly and individually defined by politicians and policy makers, particularly in terms of 
equating being employed with being included. We conclude with discussion about the need to 
strengthen the social inclusion framework by adopting an understanding of social inequality and 
social justice that is more relational and less categorical.   
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Introduction 
The	term	‘social	inclusion’	became	a	guiding	concept	for	Australian	social	policy	with	the	
election	of	the	Labor	Government	in	Australia	in	2007,	which	argued	the	need	for	a	multi‐
dimensional	approach	to	poverty	and	other	forms	of	social	disadvantage.	Being	‘included’	was	
more	specifically	defined	by	the	new	government	as	being	able	to	‘have	the	resources,	
opportunities	and	capabilities	needed	to	learn,	work,	engage	and	have	a	voice’	(ASIB	2010).	This	
definition	was	based	on	advice	from	the	Australian	Social	Inclusion	Board,	established	soon	
after	the	election	of	the	ALP	Government.	The	definition	draws	on	a	human	capital	approach,	
which	privileges	an	economic	lens	by	equating	participation	in	education	and	employment	with	
the	notion	of	being	included	in	society.	The	language	of	social	inclusion	in	official	policy	
discourse	was	relatively	short‐lived	in	Australia,	having	been	swept	aside	with	the	change	in	late	
2013	to	a	federal	Coalition	Government,	led	by	Prime	Minister	Tony	Abbott.	On	the	same	day	the	
new	government	was	being	sworn	in,	the	Social	Inclusion	Unit	and	the	Board	were	disbanded	
(Karvelas	2013).	We	agree	with	Peter	Saunders	(this	volume)	that	the	demise	of	the	ALP	
Government	has	meant	that	social	inclusion	is	no	longer	a	guiding	framework	or	policy	priority	
at	the	political	or	departmental	level.	Our	interest	in	this	paper	is	in	analysing	the	concept	of	
social	inclusion,	particularly	whether	the	approach	taken	by	the	ALP	Government	had	the	
potential	to	deliver	on	the	promise	of	a	more	inclusive	society.		
What	we	argue	in	the	paper	is	that	the	ALP	Government	pursued	a	fairly	narrow	‘welfare	to	
work’	policy	agenda	under	the	social	inclusion	banner,	an	approach	that	offered	an	insufficient	
response	to	other	factors	that	lead	to	social	inequality	and	entrenched	disadvantage,	such	as	
chronic	health	problems,	incarceration,	permanent	disability,	and	discrimination.	In	this	sense,	
the	social	inclusion	framework	represented	a	continuity	with	the	existing	institutional	logic	of	
the	Australian	welfare	state	(Bryson	1992;	Jamrozik	2005),	with	its	emphasis	on	paid	work	as	
the	main	engine	of	redistribution	and	principal	marker	of	citizenship,	despite	the	fact	that	the	
labour	market	in	Australia	is	no	longer	able	to	offer	the	economic	security	that	it	was	able	to	
provide	in	the	mid	to	late	twentieth	century	(Howe	2012).	Moreover,	the	anti‐welfare	populism	
and	welfare	paternalism	that	typically	accompanies	welfare‐to‐work	policies	in	countries	like	
Australia	work	against	the	principle	of	inclusion	in	a	socio‐cultural	sense	because	they	construct	
a	separate	and	problematic	‘other’	that	must	be	reformed,	managed	and	disciplined	(Hoggett	et	
al.	2010).	As	such,	the	dynamics	of	the	social	exclusion	discourse	are	always	potentially	
perverse,	in	that	the	effect	of	the	inclusion/exclusion	binary	is	to	exclude	while	simultaneously	
seeking	to	include	(Scanlon	&	Adlam	2008).	In	the	contemporary	context,	the	social	inclusion	
policy	framework	struggles	to	escape	the	broader	social	logic	of	a	disciplinary	state,	exemplified	
by	the	convergence	between	the	penal	modality	–	security,	surveillance,	law	and	order,	
punishment	–	and	a	muted	welfare	modality,	which	is	becoming	more	conditional,	more	risk	
conscious,	and	more	focused	on	managing	problem	populations,	rather	than	addressing	social	
need	(Garland	1999;	Wacquant	2009;	Standing	2011).		
This	conceptualisation	of	the	‘socially	excluded’	as	a	threat	to	cultural	norms	and	social	inclusion	
as	equated	with	market	integration	is	dominant	in	countries	that	have	a	highly	commodified	
welfare	state.	It	is	important	to	place	the	policy	narrative	of	the	Australian	social	inclusion	
agenda	in	an	international	context	given	the	role	that	‘policy	transfer’	between	countries	plays	
in	shaping	national	policy	agendas.	In	this	regard,	Australia	has	been	influenced	by	the	UK	
experiment	in	using	social	inclusion	to	frame	social	policy	interventions.	UK	social	scientists	
have	developed	robust	analysis	of	the	social	inclusion	agenda.	Ruth	Levitas’s	(1999)	critique	of	
the	UK	Labour	Government’s	implementation	of	the	social	inclusion	policy	agenda,	for	example,	
showed	that	in	practice	the	government	adopted	a	social	integration	approach	to	inclusion	
through	privileging	paid	employment,	while	neglecting	a	more	redistributive	approach	to	
addressing	social	inequality.	Subsequent	analyses	of	the	UK	Labour	Government’s	approach	
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found	that	in	the	last	term	of	the	Blair/Brown	Labour	government	there	was	more	income	
redistribution	taking	place,	but	there	was	a	preference	for	using	the	tax	system	for	
redistribution,	rather	than	the	cash	transfer	system	(Bradshaw	2011).	Using	the	tax	system	
rather	than	social	welfare	to	redistribute	resources	and	goods	was	politically	motivated,	as	the	
government	was	trying	to	differentiate	itself	from	the	state‐centric	ideology	of	previous	Labour	
administrations	(Levitas	2005).		
As	we	will	show	in	the	first	part	of	this	paper,	Australia	has	followed	a	similar	path	in	privileging	
paid	work	as	the	primary	mechanism	for	promoting	inclusion	in	both	rhetoric	and	practice,	
particularly	through	its	welfare‐to‐work	policies	and	their	associated	compliance	measures.	It	is	
for	this	reason	that	the	paper	will	make	various	comparisons	with	the	UK,	given	the	influence	
that	the	UK	Government	has	had	on	the	conception	of	social	inclusion‐exclusion	developed	in	
Australia,	particularly	the	emphasis	on	market	integration	as	the	main	marker	of	‘inclusion’.	In	
our	view,	a	market	integrationist	approach	to	inclusion	has	three	main	problems,	which	we	
outline	in	the	paper.	The	first	is	that	this	approach	conceives	of	inclusion‐exclusion	in	
categorical,	rather	than	relational	terms,	a	conception	that	can	be	inadvertently	promoted	by	the	
use	of	‘objective’	research	measures	for	monitoring	the	degree	of	social	exclusion	in	Australia.		
The	second	problem	is	that	the	main	thrust	of	the	national	policy	agenda	remains	silent	on	other	
ways	in	which	people	become	social	citizens,	as	in	participation	in	care,	education,	and	
volunteering	activities.	And	the	third	problem	is	that	the	Australian	social	inclusion	policy	
agenda	focus	on	‘welfare‐to‐work’	is	decidedly	utilitarian,	with	its	emphasis	on	making	various	
categories	of	‘excluded’	conform	to	the	norms	of	the	majority	through	sanctions,	nudges,	and	
surveillance	(Standing	2011:	154).		
In	examining	these	tensions	our	aim	in	this	paper	is	to	engage	in	critical	review	of	the	Australian	
social	inclusion	agenda	policy	narrative	–	rather	than	detailed	analysis	of	policy	agenda	and	
implementation	–	a	task	that	we	hope	will	contribute	to	a	more	imaginative	and	well‐rounded	
set	of	policy	principles	and	programs	that	are	able	to	respond	adequately	to	growing	income	
inequality,	entrenched	disadvantage,	and	economic	insecurity.	In	the	paper	we	will	make	
reference	to	various	social	policy	initiatives	introduced	under	the	banner	of	social	inclusion,	but	
we	will	not	undertake	a	detailed	evaluation	of	any	one	program,	as	that	is	beyond	the	scope	of	
this	paper.	In	prioritising	the	policy	narrative	in	our	analysis	we	take	our	analytical	cue	from	the	
work	of	Carol	Lee	Bacchi	(2009),	who	argues	that	it	is	important	to	interrogate	critically	the	
representations	of	social	problems,	as	they	inevitably	contain	assumptions	that	inform	the	
policy	solutions	proposed	and	implemented.	In	the	case	of	social	inclusion	policy	discourse	
several	of	these	assumptions	are	relevant:	that	unemployment	equals	exclusion;	that	paid	work	
equals	inclusion;	and	that	non‐paid	work	by	itself	cannot	achieve	inclusion	(van	Berkel	&	Moller	
2002).	In	a	similar	vein,	we	note	the	added	degree	of	nuance	afforded	by	Lister’s	notion	of	
‘diminished	inclusion’	(1999:	47),	whereby	being	in	low‐paid	work	offers	few	real	opportunities	
for	full	inclusion;	and	with	much	the	same	effect,	Sen’s	point	concerning	‘unfavourable	
inclusion’,	by	which	the	price	exacted	for	being	included	is	high,	leading	to	‘adverse	
participation’	(Sen	2000:	29).		
A brief history of the idea of social exclusion-inclusion  
The	origins	of	the	term	social	exclusion	can	be	found	in	the	French	socialist	governments	of	the	
1980s,	where	it	showed	much	promise	as	a	tool	for	conceptualising	the	diverse	sources	of	
poverty	and	exclusion	from	society	(Percy‐Smith	2000:	1).	It	was	a	term	used	to	refer	to	a	
disparate	group	of	people	living	on	the	margins	of	society	without	access	to	social	protection.	
Later	manifestations	of	the	term,	evident	in	the	formative	treaties	establishing	the	European	
Economic	Community	and	especially	negotiations	around	the	Maastricht	Treaty,	marked	a	shift	
from	early	conceptualisations	in	their	emphasis	on	social	and	economic	cohesion	(Percy‐Smith	
4	
	
2000:	1).	The	European	Union	(EU)	poverty	programs	in	existence	since	1974	were	brought	to	a	
halt	in	1994	and	social	exclusion,	defined	primarily	in	terms	of	labour	market	exclusion	rather	
than	poverty,	became	the	main	focus	of	social	policy	in	the	EU.	While	continuing	to	endorse	the	
importance	of	social	inclusion	measures	and	monitoring,	EU	member	states	have	also	struggled	
to	‘mainstream’	social	inclusion	objectives	into	public	policy	development	and	implementation	
(Atkinson	et	al.	2007).		
The	UK	Government	became	an	enthusiastic	proponent	of	the	social	inclusion‐exclusion	
framework	in	the	late	1990s.	In	the	UK,	social	exclusion	was	endorsed	as	a	policy	concept	in	
1997	when	the	then	Prime	Minister,	Tony	Blair,	set	up	the	Social	Exclusion	Unit	(SEU)	and	
loosely	defined	it	as	a	‘shorthand	term	for	what	can	happen	when	people	or	areas	suffer	from	a	
combination	of	linked	problems	such	as	unemployment,	poor	skills,	low	incomes,	poor	housing,	
high	crime	environments,	bad	health	and	family	breakdown’	(Blair	1997:	3).	This	multi‐
dimensional	definition	equates	social	exclusion	with	marginalisation.		When	pressed	to	explain	
what	social	exclusion	actually	meant,	Blair	responded	that	‘everyone	knows	what	social	
exclusion	is’	and	uttered	the	now	infamous	mantra	calling	for	‘joined‐up	solutions	to	joined‐up	
problems’	(Blair	1997:	4).	Here	is	an	example	of	one	of	the	central	problems	in	discussing	the	
concepts	of	social	inclusion‐exclusion.	As	Levitas	(1999;	2005;	2006;	2012)	notes,	the	terms	are	
widely	used	interchangeably	and	are	entirely	fluid	in	their	definition.	Social‐inclusion‐exclusion	
are	not	merely	two	sides	of	the	same	coin,	as	policies	associated	with	social	inclusion	can	be	
narrowly	framed	around	paid	employment.	Indeed	many	of	the	key	features	of	social	exclusion,	
such	as		being	left	out	of		‘social	relations	and	patterns	of	sociability’	are	ignored	or	
reconstructed	as	matters	for	individual	choice	making	and	responsibility	(Levitas	2005:	123).		
Clearly,	there	is	a	difference	between	academic	understandings	of	inclusion	and	the	
implementation	of	social	inclusion	policies	by	government.	The	different	but	complementary	
work	of	Amartya	Sen	and	Martha	Nussbaum	on	the	human	capabilities	framework,	for	example,	
does	not	privilege	economic	participation	and	importantly	it	rests	upon	the	moral	significance	of	
individuals’	capability	of	achieving	the	kind	of	lives	they	have	reason	to	value,	which	may	
include	time	to	cultivate	loving	relationships,	to	play,	and	to	develop	political	freedom	(Sen	
1981;	2000).	This	ethical	valuation	differs	from	utilitarianism,	which	is	more	concerned	with	the	
best	means	for	achieving	the	‘good	life’	for	the	greatest	number.	The	policy	implication	from	the	
capabilities	moral	framework	is	that	the	means	and	ends	should	be	democratically	debated	by	
any	given	society	and	that	whatever	is	decided	there	are	likely	to	be	a	range	of	inclusion	
signifiers	and	integration	measures	that	will	need	to	be	recognised	–	beyond	paid	employment.	
Citizens	can	be	excluded	from	political	processes,	from	education,	from	informal	social	
networks,	from	secure	housing	and	from	cultural,	sporting	and	recreational	activities.	
Accordingly,	there	is	no	reason	to	assume	that	paid	employment	is	the	right	solution,	
particularly	given	recent	changes	in	the	labour	market.	As	Whiteford	(2013:	65)	suggests:	
…encouraging	participation	in	the	paid	labour	market	is	of	crucial	importance.	
But	not	everyone	can	benefit	from	paid	work.	Moreover,	widening	wage	
disparities	and	high	levels	of	underemployment	–	particularly	for	women	–	in	
combination	with	changes	to	family	payments	–	raise	the	risk	that	in‐work	
poverty	could	become	more	salient	in	future.		
Despite	the	critique	of	simplistic	‘work‐first’	solutions,	the	political	commitment	for	
implementing	a	multi‐dimensional	social	inclusion	agenda	has	been	lacking	in	Australia.	There	
has	been	a	mix	of	contradictory	political	messages	attached	to	the	social	inclusion	agenda,	which	
is	further	complicated	by	the	federal	system	of	government,	as	the	next	section	illustrates.	
 
Recent social policy developments in Australia  
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The	concepts	of	social	inclusion	and	social	exclusion	gained	increasing	prominence	in	Australian	
social	policy	from	the	early	2000s.	The	idea	came	into	practice	–	at	least	initially–	at	a	state	
government,	rather	than	a	federal	government	level.	Following	New	Labour’s	lead	in	the	UK,	the	
South	Australian	Labor	government	established	the	Social	Inclusion	Unit	in	2002	with	the	
expressed	commitment	of	tackling	social	exclusion	by	examining	‘the	complex	and	interrelated	
causes	of	disadvantage	and	adopting	a	whole	of	government,	and	more	importantly,	whole	of	
community	response’	(Government	of	South	Australia	2009:	2).	The	unit	was	discontinued	by	
the	new	state	(ALP)	Premier	Jay	Wetherall	after	he	succeeded	Mike	Rann	in	2011	and	its	social	
policy	functions	returned	to	mainstream	welfare	departments.	In	Victoria,	a	broader	vision	of	
social	disadvantage	beyond	narrow	economic	poverty	measures	contributed	to	the	2005	
development	of	Victoria’s	Neighbourhood	renewal	and	broader	‘A	Fairer	Victoria’	framework,	
with	$5	billion	available	to	‘address	disadvantage	and	promote	inclusion’	(Victorian	Government	
2005).	This	framing	of	welfare	policies	in	Victoria	lasted	five	years	until	late	2010	when	the	
state	Labor	Government	failed	to	win	its	re‐election	bid.		
At	the	national	level,	the	incoming	Labor	Government	in	2007	announced	its	social	inclusion	
agenda	and	shortly	thereafter	established	a	Social	Inclusion	ministerial	portfolio	–	initially	held	
by	then	Deputy	Prime	Minister	Julia	Gillard	–	and	the	Australian	Social	Inclusion	Board	in	the	
Department	of	the	Prime	Minister	and	Cabinet	in	December	2007.	According	to	the	first	annual	
report	of	the	Social	Inclusion	Board,	the	Government	was	committed	to	a	social	inclusion	agenda	
that	is	‘about	building	a	stronger,	fairer	nation	in	which	every	Australian	gets	a	fair	go	at	the	
things	that	make	for	an	active	and	fulfilling	life’.	Being	socially	included	was	said	to	mean:	
...that	people	have	the	resources,	opportunities	and	capabilities	they	need	to:	
learn	(participate	in	education	and	training);	work	(participate	in	employment,	
unpaid	or	voluntary	work	including	family	and	carer	responsibilities);	engage	
(connect	with	people,	use	local	services	and	participate	in	local,	cultural,	civic	and	
recreational	activities);	and,	have	a	voice	(influence	decisions	that	affect	them)	
(ASIB	2010:	15).	
Similar	to	Europe,	the	emphasis	in	the	above	definition	is	on	rights	and	responsibilities,	and	the	
need	to	be	active	in	either	learning	or	earning,	which	stands	in	opposition	to	the	construction	of	
social	assistance	as	‘passive	welfare’.1	The	above	definition	also	makes	reference	to	the	right	of	
citizens	to	have	a	voice	–	to	be	involved	in	decisions	that	affect	them	–	which	partly	reflects	the	
growing	strength	of	the	consumer	rights	movement	in	health	and	welfare	policy	in	Australia	
(Ramon	et	al.	2007).		
What	was	given	most	attention	by	the	Australian	Labor	Government	in	its	first	and	second	term	
–	as	evidenced	by	policy	announcements	and	federal	budget	priorities	–	was	reviewing	
eligibility	for	rebates	for	private	health	insurance,	changes	to	parenting	payments,	continuation	
of	income	support	management	in	the	Northern	Territory	for	Indigenous	Australians,	and	
maintaining	the	disparity	between	pensions	and	unemployment	benefits	(Newstart).	In	his	
research,	Peter	Whiteford	(2011)	showed	that,	since	1996,	social	security	payments	for	the	
single	unemployed	had	fallen	from	23.5	per	cent	of	the	average	wage	for	men	to	19.5	per	cent.	
The	level	of	Newstart	for	a	single	person	had	also	fallen	from	around	54	per	cent	to	45	per	cent	
of	the	after‐tax	minimum	wage.	Newstart	has	fallen	from	46	per	cent	of	median	family	income	in	
1996	to	36	per	cent	in	2009–10,	and	shows	the	degree	of	income	loss	over	time	as	a	result	of	
different	indexation	figures.	Compulsory	Income	Management	(CIM)	was	introduced	by	the	
conservative	Howard	government	in	2007	and	was	initially	targeted	at	Aboriginal	communities	
and	trialled	in	the	Northern	Territory	Emergency	Response	(NTER).	In	this	context,	income	
management	meant	restrictions	on	social	security	payments	so	that	parents	would	spend	their	
money	on	food	and	other	necessities,	rather	than	on	alcohol.	Around	fifty	to	seventy	per	cent	of	
a	person’s	payments	(administered	by	Centrelink	on	behalf	of	the	Australian	Federal	
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Government’s	Department	of	Human	Services)	was	quarantined	in	the	form	of	a	‘BasicsCard’,	
which	could	only	be	used	to	buy	groceries	and	other	essential	items	at	designated	stores.	Family	
welfare	payments	were	also	linked	to	children’s	school	attendance	in	the	School	Enrolment	and	
School	Attendance	Measure	(SEAM).	The	Income	Management	policy	was	continued	under	
Labour,	but	extended	beyond	Indigenous	communities	in	2012	to	five	trial	sites	across	Australia,	
in	Place	Based	Income	Management	(PBIM)	to	2017	(Mendes	et	al.	2013).	
Focus	on	the	deserving	and	undeserving	poor,	a	suspicion	of	recipients	‘cheating	the	system’	
was	also	evident	in	other	aspects	of	income	support	policy	changes.	A	2012	Federal	Budget	
announcement,	for	example,	included	a	cost	saving	provision	that	around	83,000	single	parents	
be	moved	from	Parenting	Payment	Single	to	the	lower	rate	of	Newstart	Allowance	when	their	
youngest	child	turns	eight.	The	policy	was	justified	as	a	form	of	motivation	for	inclusion	in	the	
workforce	(Australian	Council	of	Social	Service	2012;	2013),	conveniently	ignoring	the	evidence	
that	many	single	mothers	are	highly	motivated	and	already	working,	possibly	in	multiple	jobs	
(Grahame	&	Marston	2012).	In	this	policy	framework	the	work	ethic	is	deployed	to	chastise	the	
unemployed,	even	though	the	scenario	of	enough	secure	and	decently	paid	work	for	all	has	
ceased	and	is	unlikely	to	return	in	any	concrete	way	(Howe	2012).	The	one‐sided	policy	focus	on	
labour	market	demand,	rather	than	supply,	minimises	ways	in	which	labour	market	
opportunities	could	be	more	fairly	distributed.	This	is	not	only	a	problem	relevant	to	the	
Australian	context,	As	Bauman	(1998:80)	argues:	
For	the	affluent	part	of	the	world	and	the	affluent	sections	of	well‐off	societies,	
the	work	ethic	is	a	one‐sided	affair.	It	spells	out	the	duties	of	those	who	struggle	
with	survival;	it	says	nothing	about	the	duties	of	those	who	rose	above	mere	
survival	and	went	on	to	more	elevated,	loftier	concerns.	In	particular,	it	denies	the	
dependency	of	the	first	upon	the	second,	and	so	releases	the	second	from	
responsibility	for	the	first.		
The	main	policy	assumption	here	is	that	being	unemployed	means	one	is	not	participating	
socially	or	economically	–	thus	the	equation	of	paid	work	with	inclusion	and	the	marginalisation	
of	an	ethic	of	care	in	the	formation	of	social	citizenship.	It	needs	to	be	acknowledged	that	some	
announcements	late	in	the	term	of	the	ALP	government	laid	the	foundations	for	non‐paid	work‐
based	inclusion	measures,	such	as	the	National	Disability	Insurance	Scheme	and	a	national	paid	
maternity	leave	scheme.	These	more	recent	initiatives	were	less	explicitly	about	paid	work,	
though	they	are	not	completely	divorced	from	this	policy	goal	either,	given	that	paid	maternity	
leave	is	in	one	sense	about	ensuring	mothers	retain	their	attachment	to	the	paid	workforce.		
The	dominant	approach	promoted	by	Australian	policy	makers	during	this	period	of	
government	is	best	captured	by	what	Veit‐Wilson	(1998:	45	in	Byrne	1999:	4)	describes	as	a	
weak	version	of	inclusion:	
In	the	weak	version	of	the	discourse,	the	solutions	lie	in	altering	these	excluded	
people’s	handicapping	characteristics	and	enhancing	their	integration	into	
dominant	society.	‘Stronger’	forms	of	this	discourse	may	also	emphasise	the	role	
of	those	who	are	doing	the	excluding	and	therefore	aim	for	solutions,	which	
reduce	the	powers	of	exclusion.	
The	weak	version	resonates	with	what	Levitas	(1999)	defines	as	the	social	integrationist	and	
moral	‘underclass’	discourses	of	social	inclusion,	while	the	strong	version	reflects	a	
redistributive	egalitarian	discourse	that	embraces	notions	of	social	justice	and	social	citizenship.	
Levitas	explains	that	social	inclusion	is	a	‘powerful	concept,	not	because	of	its	analytical	clarity	
which	is	conspicuously	lacking,	but	because	of	its	flexibility’	(2005:	178).	This	means	it	is	used	in	
widely	different,	often	interchangeable	ways:		
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The	term	social	exclusion	is	intrinsically	problematic.	It	represents	the	primary	
significant	division	in	society	as	one	between	an	included	majority	and	an	
excluded	minority….	Exclusion	appears	as	an	essentially	peripheral	problem,	
existing	at	the	boundary	of	society,	rather	than	a	feature	of	society,	which	
characteristically	delivers	massive	inequalities	across	the	board	and	chronic	
deprivation	for	a	large	minority.	The	solution	implied	by	a	discourse	of	social	
exclusion	is	a	minimalist	one:	a	transition	across	the	boundary	to	become	an	
insider	rather	than	an	outsider	in	a	society	whose	structural	inequalities	remain	
largely	un‐interrogated	(Levitas	2005:	7).	
The	endorsement	of	a	‘weak	version’	of	social	inclusion	promoted	by	the	ALP	Government	
undermined	the	political	potential	of	the	concept	to	provide	a	comprehensive	account	of	the	
sources	of	disadvantage	and	exclusion.	The	approach	to	social	inclusion	adopted	by	the	
government	added	little	value	to	understanding	or	acting	on	the	mechanisms	and	institutions	
that	sustain	privilege,	inequality	and	disadvantage.	In	part,	this	soft	version	of	social	inclusion	
may	reflect	the	political	context	in	Australia	during	this	period,	such	as	minority	government,	
short‐term	decision	making,	and	an	increasing	reliance	on	poll‐driven	policy	development.	And	
in	terms	of	public	administration,	despite	the	Social	Inclusion	Board	being	part	of	the	Office	of	
the	Prime	Minister	and	Cabinet,	actual	decisions	about	welfare,	health	and	education	were	still	
driven	by	line	agencies	and	their	Ministers.	And	as	noted	by	Peter	Saunders	in	this	volume,	there	
were	signs	in	the	federal	bureaucracy	that	government	departments	resisted	the	breaking	down	
of	silos	that	the	inclusion	agenda	demanded.		
What	these	examples	illustrate	is	that	the	Australian	social	inclusion	policy	agenda	and	
governance	has	for	the	most	part	been	a	case	of	continuity,	rather	than	discontinuity.		In	short,	
the	political	mantra	that	‘work	is	the	best	form	of	welfare’	continues	to	ignore	the	fact	that	
labour	markets	in	advanced	capitalist	countries	are	increasingly	unable	to	deliver	jobs	that	offer	
economic	security	(Karvelas	2014).	On	the	flip	side	of	equating	labour	market	dependency	with	
self‐reliance	is	the	notion	that	so‐called	‘welfare	dependency’	is	pervasive	–	which	legitimates	an	
individualist	construction	of	the	problem	of	poverty	as	being	associated	with	the	receipt	of	
income	support	by	the	state.	This	‘moral	hazard’	argument,	coupled	with	a	strong	association	
between	social	inclusion	and	labour	market	integration	reinforces	an	individualised	conception	
of	unemployment.	As	Saunders	(2005:	5)	points	out	about	the	concept	of	social	inclusion‐
exclusion,	when	placed	in	the	wrong	hands,	social	exclusion	can	become	a	vehicle	for	vilifying	
those	who	do	not	conform	and	an	excuse	for	seeing	their	problems	as	caused	by	their	own	
‘aberrant	behaviour’.		Used	in	this	sense,	the	term	social	exclusion	becomes	little	more	than	a	
new	expression	for	the	‘underclass’,	‘the	dangerous	class’,	or	‘human	waste’	associated	with	
global	capitalism	and	excess	of	population.	As	Bauman	(2007:	31)	notes:		
Those	who	escape	transportation	(unlike	refugees)	and	remain	inside	the	
enclosure	are	earmarked	for	recycling	and	rehabilitation;	their	state	of	exclusion	
is	an	abnormality	which	demands	a	cure	and	musters	a	therapy;	they	clearly	need	
to	be	helped	‘back	in’	as	soon	as	possible.		
The	division	between	‘them’	and	‘us’	remains	sharp	in	this	policy	narrative.	Moreover,	the	moral	
binaries	reinforce	a	categorical	rather	than	a	relational	approach	to	social	inclusion.	In	contrast,	
Silver	and	Miller	(2003)	use	a	relational	approach	in	conceptualising	inclusion‐exclusion,	in	the	
sense	that	it	is	not	enough	to	focus	on	the	unemployed,	the	homeless	or	the	poor.	They	argue	we	
must	use	the	concept	to	focus	also	on	the	so‐called	‘included’,	as	this	brings	into	the	frame	the	
way	in	which	dominant	groups	in	society	benefit	from	low	wages,	unemployment,	and	inflated	
rents	in	capital	city	housing	markets.	Tilly’s	(1999)	contribution	on	understanding	social	
inequality	around	income	and	opportunity	is	relevant	here.	According	to	Tilly	(1999),	two	
powerful	social	processes	are	fundamental	to	reproducing	inequality:	exploitation	and	
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opportunity	hoarding.	Exploitation	is	the	process	by	which	powerful	connected	people	have	
control	over	resources	and	use	those	resources	to	enlist	others	in	the	production	of	value	while	
excluding	them	from	the	full	value	added	by	their	efforts,	using	any	of	a	number	of	means,	such	
as	legislation,	work	rules,	and	outright	repression.	Opportunity	hoarding	occurs	when	members	
of	a	categorically	based	network	confine	the	use	of	the	value‐producing	resource	to	others	in	the	
in‐group	(Voss	2010).	This	view	of	power	relations	is	not	that	dissimilar	to	Weber’s	(1985:	42)	
concept	of	‘social	closure’,	which	reflects	efforts	by	the	powerful	to	exclude	less	powerful	groups	
from	the	benefits	of	joint	enterprises.	Importantly	these	conceptions	of	exclusion/inclusion	
move	the	level	of	analysis	away	from	‘deficient’	individuals	and	illuminate	class,	gender	and	
ethnic	relations	as	struggles	over	material	and	symbolic	resources.		
If	the	political	and	policy	gaze	is	on	the	‘excluded’	then	we	miss	the	possibility	of	seeing	the	
dynamic	between	the	insiders	and	outsiders,	the	dominant	and	dominated	and	the	power	
struggles	between	different	groups.	Moreover,	in	political	terms	we	reduce	the	capacity	to	
develop	a	‘sociological	imagination’	around	addressing	public	problems	because	we	miss	
analysing	the	institutional	organisational	mechanisms	that	produce	and	sustain	enduring	
inequalities	and	anti‐democratic	practices	(Tilly	1999;	Sen	2000).	As	Nevile	(2006:	88)	argues	in	
her	distinction	between	active	and	passive	exclusion,	active	exclusion	is	the	result	of	a	
deliberate	decision	to	deny	certain	people	or	groups	of	people	particular	opportunities	–	as	in	
the	Commonwealth	Government’s	decision	to	restrict	refugees	access	to	a	range	of	benefits,	
depending	on	their	mode	of	arrival.	Passive	inclusion	may	be	understood	as	the	unintended	
consequences	of	policy	initiatives	that	do	not	seek	to	exclude,	but	because	of	attendant	factors	
such	as	lack	of	affordable	child	care,	a	sub‐optimal	level	of	inclusion	may	be	all	that	can	be	
achieved	(Nevile	2006:	88).	A	relational	approach	also	invites	a	critique	of	‘mainstream’	values	
and	practices,	rather	than	simply	accepting	that	the	individualisation	of	economic	risk	is	a	
positive	social	norm.	This	point	about	the	need	to	problematise	the	role	of	the	state	and	the	
hazards	of	market‐based	risk	management	is	acknowledged	by	Zizek	(2008:	32)	when	he	argues	
that:	‘society	itself	is	responsible	for	the	calamity	against	which	it	then	offers	itself	as	the	
remedy’.	These	contradictions	need	to	be	acknowledged	in	discussions	about	integration	and	
differentiation,	as	does	a	more	honest	appraisal	of	the	way	in	which	capitalist	economies	
generate	economic	inequalities	and	multiple	forms	of	marginalisation.		
	
Recent research directions in Australia around the concept of social exclusion 
A	categorical	approach	to	inclusion/exclusion	has	been	inadvertently	reinforced	through	
national	research	measuring	the	population	defined	as	‘socially	excluded’,	some	undertaken	by	
government	and	others	by	university	researchers.	Regardless	of	important	differences	in	what	
measures	are	used	for	the	indicators,	they	all	share	a	similar	purpose,	that	is,	to	track	what	
proportion	of	the	population	can	be	considered	‘socially	excluded’.	One	example	of	this	work	is	
the	Social	Exclusion	Monitor	developed	by	the	Brotherhood	of	Saint	Laurence	in	conjunction	
with	Melbourne	University	(Horn	et	al.	2011).	One	aim	of	the	monitor	is	to	track	over	time	what	
proportion	of	the	population	suffers	from	varying	degrees	of	social	exclusion,	based	on	analyses	
of	secondary	survey	data	compiled	into	a	set	of	indicators.	Another	aim	of	the	monitor	is	to	
benchmark	how	well	the	Australian	Government’s	social	inclusion	policy	was	progressing.	As	
such	it	seeks	to	promote	further	inquiry	into	the	dynamics	and	processes	that	lead	to	inclusion	
or	exclusion.	The	indicators	used	in	Australia	are	similar	to	those	used	in	western	European	
countries,	which	all	accept	that	social	exclusion	is	multi‐dimensional,	but	beyond	that	there	is	no	
agreement	about	which	indicators	are	more	salient	or	causal	(Silver	&	Miller	2003).	While	this	
approach	is	certainly	an	advance	on	simply	relying	on	income	poverty	as	a	measure	of	social	and	
economic	deprivation,	the	framework	can	inadvertently	reinforce	a	technical	and	categorical	
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approach	to	understanding	and	addressing	complex	social,	political,	economic	and	cultural	
processes.	Peter	Saunders	(this	volume)	provides	more	detailed	analysis	and	discussion	of	the	
pros	and	cons	of	the	different	conceptions	and	measures	of	social	exclusion	in	Australia,	
including	the	framework	and	indicators	developed	by	the	Social	Policy	Research	Centre	at	the	
University	of	New	South	Wales.		
Certainly	there	is	a	place	for	measurement	in	understanding	the	scale	and	significance	of	a	given	
social	problem,	but	we	need	to	ensure	that	this	does	not	become	a	substitute	for	understanding	
how	processes	of	discrimination,	rejection,	isolation	and	poverty	are	produced	and	experienced.	
As	Saunders	notes	(this	volume),	there	has	been	a	relative	neglect	of	subjective	indicators	in	the	
frameworks	used	to	determine	whether	and	how	people	are	excluded.	In	general,	a	degree	of	
reflexivity	is	required,	as	Fraser	(2010:	68)	notes	in	her	caution	about	the	prominence	given	to	
‘justice	technocrats’	and	‘scientistic	presumptions’,	‘[w]hat	passes	in	the	mainstream	for	social	
science	may	well	reflect	the	perspectives,	and	entrench	the	blind	spots	of	the	privileged’.	
In	terms	of	broadening	the	social	inclusion	research	agenda,	this	means	being	specific	about	
multiple	exclusions	that	can	accentuate	each	other.	Each	form	of	inclusion	within	tightly	
conceived	and	narrowly	drawn	policy	models	is	accompanied	by	excluding	forces	that	need	to	
be	mapped	and	carefully	analysed.	For	example,	having	limited	access	to	fair	forms	of	financial	
credit	is	a	form	of	financial	exclusion	in	capitalist	societies	that	can	be	the	result	of	geographical	
location,	household	indebtedness,	precarious	employment,	or	the	lending	practices	of	
mainstream	financial	institutions.	Collapsing	this	problem	under	the	banner	of	‘social	exclusion’	
can	have	the	effect	of	blunting	these	interlocking	economic	realities.	Similarly,	we	need	to	insist	
on	a	spatial	understanding	of	relations	of	advantage	and	disadvantage,	given	the	marginalisation	
of	poorer	communities	on	the	fringes	of	major	metropolitan	cities,	away	from	jobs	and	
affordable	transport	options.	While	the	research	community	is	now	much	more	sophisticated	in	
analysing	the	importance	of	space	and	location	in	relation	to	economic	opportunity	(Vinson	
2007;	2010),	policy	makers	have	tended	to	respond	narrowly	to	the	spatial	challenge	by	
targeting	punitive	policy	measures	at	poorer	locations	–	e.g.,	place‐based	income	management	–	
rather	than	looking	at	what	sort	of	mechanisms	would	improve	social	and	economic	integration	
in	cities.	Taking	spatial	analysis	more	seriously	would	mean	considering	how	the	design	of	
modern	cities	in	capitalist	economies	promotes	private	consumption,	private	transport	and	
property	rights	(Peck	2001).	Insisting	on	decent	public	infrastructure,	such	as	public	libraries,	
free	public	transport,	accessible	public	parks	and	community	gardens	can	ameliorate	some	of	
these	effects,	but	it	requires	political	leadership	that	refuses	to	be	unduly	influenced	by	private	
and	corporate	interests.	And	it	requires	urban	planners,	community	leaders	and	architects	being	
on	social	policy	advisory	committees,	not	only	welfare	experts,	business	leaders,	academics	and	
economists.		
Equally,	and	perhaps	most	importantly,	we	need	to	ensure	that	any	policy	development	or	
research	measurement	exercise	does	not	discount	the	ways	in	which	those	citizens	placed	in	
researcher‐defined	categories	of	‘excluded’	have	their	own	understanding	of	processes	of	
exclusion,	and	what	might	be	done	to	improve	their	wellbeing.	This	point	reflects	a	more	general	
ethical	sentiment	about	being	careful	that	we	do	not	simply	construct	low‐income	citizens	and	
households	in	terms	of	their	deficits,	or	abstract	lives	into	statistical	categories	that	make	an	
arbitrary	distinction	between	the	included	and	excluded	without	appreciation	of	the	subjective	
dimensions	of	inclusion	and	exclusion.	While	these	unintended	outcomes	are	not	the	intention	
of	well‐meaning	social	researchers,	it	is	always	a	risk	that	research	subjects	become	‘othered’	
through	abstraction	and	reification,	which	in	itself	goes	against	the	emphasis	on	‘people	having	
voice’	in	the	ALP	Government’s	definition	of	social	inclusion	(ASIB	2010).	In	overcoming	this	
limitation	we	need	to	insist	on	multi‐disciplinary	research	approaches	that	research	up	as	well	
as	down	the	income	ladder,	and	which	include	a	variety	of	methods	to	ensure	that	there	is	a	
10	
	
greater	relational	understanding	of	the	processes	that	produce	exclusion.	In	the	next	and	final	
section	of	the	paper	we	attempt	to	sketch	a	conceptual	framework	that	would	strengthen	the	
social	inclusion	discourse	in	Australia	by	arguing	for	an	approach	that	is	more	consistent	with	a	
relational	view	of	social	inequality	and	social	injustice.		
	
Strengthening the discourse of social inclusion-exclusion 
To	get	beyond	a	‘weak	discourse’	version	of	social	inclusion	we	want	to	suggest	that		
governments	might	do	well	to	revisit	and	refurbish	some	of	their	guiding	social	policy	principles	
from	the	twentieth	century,	such	as	social	citizenship	and	social	justice.	Here,	we	propose	an	
approach	that	captures	the	relational	and	stratified	nature	of	divisions	within	society	by	
acknowledging	the	relations	of	power	that	underlie	the	divisions	between	social	groups.	A	broad	
account	of	social	welfare	and	social	justice,	such	as	that	advocated	by	Titmuss	(1958),	Townsend	
(1979),	and	Jamrozik	(2005),	point	to	general	trends	in	society	and	the	distribution	of	
advantage	and	disadvantage,	while	also	signalling	the	influence	of	power	and	dominant	
interests.	In	this	sense	we	want	to	marry	a	revitalised	conception	of	social	citizenship	with	a	
relational	view	of	power	relations	within	society	in	order	to	strengthen	approaches	to	
conceptualising	inclusion‐exclusion.	
T.H.	Marshall	(1950)	is	the	usual	starting	point	for	discussing	citizenship	rights.	He	theorises	
citizenship	as	comprising	three	stages	of	broad	historical	evolution	towards	civil,	political	and	
social	rights.	Civil	citizenship,	from	the	eighteenth	century	onwards,	is	the	right	to	personal	
freedom	in	the	form	of	speech,	movement,	and	assembly.	Political	citizenship,	emerging	in	the	
nineteenth	century,	is	the	right	to	vote	and	stand	for	public	office.	Social	citizenship,	a	creation	
of	the	twentieth	century,	includes	economic	security	and	equal	access	to	health,	education	and	
employment	opportunities	(Marshall	1950).	Citizenship	is	closely	tied	to	the	enjoyment	of	rights	
and	may	be	understood	at	a	quintessential	level	as	‘the	right	to	have	rights’	(McNeely	1998:	9).	
In	this	sense,	Marshall’s	treatment	of	citizenship	refers	to	a	complex,	multi‐layered	entity	that	
traverses	legally	based	rights	and	obligations	and	also	‘natural’	or	human	rights.	This	is	
particularly	the	case	for	social	citizenship,	with	its	aspirations	for	participation,	greater	social	
equality	and	access	to	the	benefits	of	health	and	education.	Civil	and	political	rights	to	due	legal	
process	and	to	vote	are	written	into	established	law,	conferring	citizenship	with	legal	status	
(McNeely	1998),	and	are	capable	of	recognition	and	definition	‘with	some	precision’	(Heater	
2004:	114–115).		
Social	citizenship	as	considered	by	Marshall,	connects	closely	with	the	United	Nations	Human	
Rights	enactments	of	the	1940s,	contemporaneous	with	and	helping	to	shape	the	background	to	
when	he	was	writing	Citizenship	and	Social	Class	(Heater	2004).	Social	citizenship	may	be	
understood	as:		
The	whole	range	from	a	right	to	a	modicum	of	economic	welfare	and	security,	to	
the	right	to	share	to	the	full	in	the	social	heritage	and	to	live	the	life	of	a	civilized	
being,	according	to	the	standards	prevailing	in	a	civilized	society	(Marshall	1950:	
12).	
Social	citizenship	is	also	about	human	dignity,	guaranteed	by	the	welfare	state	to	ensure	that	
individuals	have	the	material	wherewithal	to	take	part	in	society.	The	centrality	of	a	state	
guarantee	of	adequate	resources	is	key	to	being	human	(Kincaid	1973).	This	perception	of	
humanity	is	linked	to	concepts	of	liberty	and	freedom	that	have	been	refined	in	the	twenty‐first	
century,	notably	in	the	work	of	Sen	(1981;	2000;	2006),	Standing	(2001;	2002;	2011)	and	Weil	
(1988).	Personal	development	and	liberty	are	interrelated	in	a	complex	way	around	the	
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concepts	of	capabilities	and	functioning.	The	central	issue	is	that	of	personal	freedom	to	realise	
fully	one’s	human	capacities.	A	well	enforced	‘structure	of	rights’	affords	each	person	the	
greatest	possible	opportunity	to	do	whatever	she	might	want	to	do	(Sen	1981:	45).		
For	Standing	(2001:	30),	real	freedom	‘requires	a	system	of	social	protection	that	allows	people	
of	all	backgrounds	to	be	able	to	make	choices’.	It	might	also	be	said	that	‘real’	choices	can	only	be	
made	when	essential	resources	are	available	to	all.	Marshall’s	trilogy	of	citizenship	categories	is	
extended	by	Standing	in	arguing	for	a	definition	of	work	far	removed	from	the	narrow	confines	
of	paid	employment,	or	the	strictures	of	welfare‐to‐work	schemes	as	gateways	to	social	security	
benefits.	Instead,	in	capturing	the	notion	of	human	potential	implicit	in	Marshall’s	social	
citizenship,	he	suggests	that	‘work	in	its	rich	sense	is	what	defines	the	human	being,	conveying	a	
restless,	creative,	reproductive	energy’,	termed	‘occupation’	(Standing	2001:	4).	
Here	then	is	a	fuller	version	of	citizenship	than	that	offered	by	the	‘industrial	citizenship’	of	
welfare‐to‐work	policies	and	the	associated	instrumental	approach	to	the	value	of	education	in	
human	capital	terms.	At	the	heart	of	these	earlier	approaches	to	citizenship	is	a	respect	for	
moral	adulthood,	autonomy	and	fairness	in	terms	of	the	distribution	of	national	goods	and	
resources,	and	an	acknowledgement	that	respectful	recognition	of	people’s	choices	and	
contributions	is	itself	a	matter	of	justice.	Devalued	social	identities	makes	denying	citizens	a	fair	
share	of	resources	politically	palatable	(Fraser	2010).	We	need	a	relational	approach	to	social	
justice	that	not	only	makes	the	connection	between	cultural	and	economic	justice	explicit,	but	
which	also	makes	the	connection	between	privilege	and	poverty	immediately	tangible,	rather	
than	‘natural’	and	acceptable.		
Recent	developments	in	political	philosophy	offer	a	model	of	social	justice	focused	on	seeing	
connections	between	privilege	and	poverty	in	a	way	that	seeks	to	uncover	structural	injustice	
and	implies	a	moral	imperative	that	justice	is	everyone’s	responsibility,	standing	in	stark	
contrast	to	a	liberal	discourse	of	self‐sufficiency,	productivity,	reward,	and	individual	blame.	Iris	
Marion	Young’s	(2011)	work	on	a	‘social	connection	model’	of	justice	is	one	such	example:	
The	social	connection	model	of	responsibility	says	that	individuals	bear	
responsibility	for	structural	justice	because	they	contribute	by	their	actions	to	the	
processes	that	produce	unjust	outcomes	(Marion	Young	2011:	103).	
From	this	perspective	it	is	disingenuous	to	suggest	that	persons	living	in	neighbourhoods	with	
poor	schools,	few	shops	and	dilapidated	housing,	miles	from	the	closest	job	opportunity	have	an	
equal	opportunity	with	other	persons	in	the	same	city.	From	a	‘social	connections	model’	of	
justice,	we	would	conclude	that	any	worry	about	irresponsibility	ought	to	be	directed	to	all	
citizens,	not	just	to	those	who	are	made	more	visible	by	state	surveillance.	We	might	also	
conclude	that	those	citizens	who	are	not	poor,	at	least	at	this	point	in	time,	participate	in	the	
same	structure	of	advantage	and	disadvantage,	constraint	and	enablement	as	those	who	fall	
below	the	poverty	line	at	some	point.	After	arriving	at	this	conclusion	it	becomes	that	much	
harder	to	absolve	ourselves	from	having	no	responsibility	for	social	injustice	(Young	2011).	This	
relational	approach	to	social	justice	also	acknowledges	that	the	line	between	vulnerable	and	
resilient	or	included	and	excluded	can	change	very	quickly,	particularly	in	times	of	personal	
illness,	acquired	disability,	or	widespread	global	economic	uncertainty.	In	short,	this	social	
connections	model	of	social	justice	would	resist	the	‘blame	welfare’	(Handler	&	Hasenfield	
2006)	discourse	that	is	dominant	in	countries	such	as	the	UK	and	Australia,	and	it	would	help	to	
promote	the	human	capability	to	see	‘the	them	in	us	and	the	us	in	them’	(Levitas	2005).		
We	do	not	have	the	space	to	articulate	the	multiple	implications	of	this	approach	for	policy	
implementation	and	human	service	delivery,	beyond	restating	the	importance	of	the	connection	
between	dominant	policy	frames	and	policy	action	and	the	importance	of	responding	to	the	
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contradictions	in	the	inclusion‐exclusion	dynamic	in	practice.	For	example,	in	terms	of	policy	
frames	it	is	important	to	acknowledge	that	the	contemporary	exclusion‐inclusion	dynamic	
around	welfare‐to‐work	and	employment	policies	has	a	much	longer	history	in	the	binary	
category	of	‘deserving’	and	‘undeserving	poor’.	Indeed,	worklessness	remains	perhaps	the	most	
powerful	engine	of	social	exclusion,	justifying	the	continual	violence	of	societal	responses	to	an	
attributed	‘intentional	refusal	to	work’,	as	there	are	few	ways	of	causing	more	societal	offence	
than	refusing	the	moral	imperative	to	‘earn	one’s	crust’	(Scanlon	&	Adlam	2011:	246).		And	in	
terms	of	local	service	delivery	in	the	provision	of	employment	assistance,	care	and	other	social	
services	there	is	a	need	to	acknowledge	the	contradictions	within	the	exclusion‐inclusion	
dynamic,	particularly	the	need	to	understand,	or	at	least	respect	the	decisions	of	those	‘that	
refuse	to	come	in	from	the	cold’	and	join	‘mainstream	society’.	As	Scanlon	&	Adlam	(2011:	244)	
argue	in	their	critique	of	the	symbolic	violence	of	a	normative	society:		
We	consider	the	plight	of	the	individual	who	refuses	to	rejoin,	or	indeed	who	may	
never	have	felt	included	in	the	first	place;	and	we	seek	to	understand	this	
problematic	social	refusal	in	the	context	of	failures	of	hospitality	and	citizenship,	
and	the	denying	of	membership	of	the	metropolitan	societal	in‐group	in	relation	
to	which	the	antisocial	individual	must	then	stand	in	opposition.		
The	challenge	is	to	avoid	scapegoating	tendencies	in	how	refusals	to	join	are	framed	and	
understood,	even	when	those	who	express	their	opposition	do	so	in	ways	that	may	be	harmful	
to	themselves	or	others.	What	we	have	tried	to	do	in	this	final	section	is	suggest	some	
alternative	first	principles	for	designing	a	different	institutional	response	to	marginalisation	and	
disadvantage	–	one	that	would	go	beyond	a	simplistic	inclusion‐exclusion	dichotomy	(Nevile	
2006),	implicating	all	citizens	in	the	project	of	creating	a	fairer,	more	genuinely	inclusive	society.		
Conclusion 
This	paper	has	discussed	the	concept	and	practice	of	social	inclusion	policy	in	Australia	from	a	
critical	standpoint	where	substantial	differences	are	seen	to	exist	between	multi‐dimensional	
government	pronouncements	on	social	inclusion‐exclusion	and	a	rather	more	narrow	emphasis	
on	paid	employment	in	major	social	policy	initiatives.	What	we	have	argued	is	that	the	social	
inclusion	policy	agenda	pursued	by	the	previous	ALP	Government	failed	to	escape	the	moral	
imperative	around	paid	employment	enshrined	in	the	institutional	legacy	of	the	exclusionary	
tendencies	within	the	‘male	wage	earner’s	welfare	state’	(Bryson	1992:	89).	As	such	the	policy	
agenda	is	likely	to	have	suffered	from	similar	shortcomings	and	unequal	outcomes,	particularly	
for	women,	Indigenous	Australians,	low‐skilled	workers,	and	the	long‐term	unemployed.	It	is	
too	early	to	tell	whether	the	National	Disability	Insurance	Scheme,	paid	maternity	leave,	and	
school	education	reforms	will	mute	the	productivist	paradigm.	At	this	stage,	our	assessment	is	
that	despite	much	initial	fanfare	about	the	social	inclusion	policy	agenda,	the	policy	frames	and	
reforms	introduced	during	this	period	were	often	a	case	of	old	wine	in	new	bottles.		
In	part,	this	critical	account	highlights	the	importance	of	the	connection	between	politics,	public	
administration,	and	policy	outcomes.	Unlike	the	UK,	Australia	did	not	embed	social	inclusion	
targets	in	all	federal	government	departments	and	the	now	defunct	Social	Inclusion	Board	was	
not	central	to	social	policy	decision	making	(Saunders	2013).	And	despite	some	sophisticated	
developments	in	social	and	economic	indicators	of	disadvantage,	the	social	inclusion	policy	
agenda	did	not	fully	embrace	the	multiple	dimensions	of	exclusion/inclusion	put	forward	by	
researchers.	All	of	this	is	not	to	say	that	the	‘weak’	policy	discourse	of	social	inclusion	could	not	
be	refashioned	into	a	framework	that	has	the	analytical	and	practical	capacity	to	address	the	
structural	inequalities	that	create	and	contribute	to	various	forms	of	social	and	economic	
marginalisation.	First,	we	need	more	public	debate	and	deliberation	about	the	quality	and	depth	
of	inclusion	that	acknowledges	the	harsh	realities	of	the	working	poor	who	‘earn’	their	poverty	
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with	multiple	low‐paid	and	insecure	jobs	(Novak	1997).	In	a	labour	market	with	a	significant	
share	of	casual	and	insecure	work,	it	is	income	that	is	in	fact	the	key	material	measure	of	
inclusion,	not	whether	someone	has	a	paid	job.	However,	even	this	recognition	does	not	get	us	
far	enough	in	acknowledging	the	important	role	that	non‐market	forms	of	inclusion	play	in	
creating	the	conditions	for	security	and	human	flourishing.		
Refurbishing	a	connected	and	embedded	model	of	social	citizenship	and	social	justice	is	a	
worthwhile	aim	as	it	acknowledges	the	dialectical	relationship	between	political	and	social	
rights	(Scott	2006).	Addressing	social	inequality	requires	clarifying	value	debates,	mobilising	
collective	agents,	and	expanding	opportunities	for	voice	in	the	public	polity.	This	in	turn	will	
help	to	define	and	shape	a	form	of	citizenship	that	is	authentically	connected	to	social,	cultural	
and	economic	modes	of	participation,	not	a	model	whereby	people	are	forced	into	being	one‐
dimensional	‘responsibilised	risk	managers’	in	a	narrowly	defined	‘job	holder’	society.	In	
contrast,	the	social	citizenship	and	social	justice	envisaged	here	is,	as	Tilly	(1999:	56)	notes,	
‘thick’	in	terms	of	rights	and	equal	status	–	as	opposed	to	‘thin’	citizenship,	loaded	with	
responsibilities	and	conditional	allowances.		
Constructing	and	implementing	a	vision	for	a	more	inclusive	society	requires	acknowledging	the	
contradictions	of	the	present,	such	as	the	way	in	which	the	welfare	state	is	both	an	enabling	and	
disabling	political‐economic	force	and	the	fact	that	in	cultural	terms	‘included’	groups	have	
always	required	‘excluded’	groups	in	order	to	defend	social	norms	that	preserve	established	
economic	interests.	We	also	need	to	acknowledge	that	conflict,	inequality	and	competition	are	
integral	features	of	capitalist	economies.	These	structural	dynamics	cannot	be	wished	away	by	
weak	social	inclusion	talk	that	both	reflects	and	reinforces	unquestioned	truths.	We	need	policy	
metaphors	and	research	that	is	able	to	sharpen,	rather	than	blunt	social	realities	in	order	to	
transcend	the	present	and	envision	what	Erik	Olin	Wright	(2010)	calls	‘real	utopias’,	which	
means	not	only	articulating	the	architecture	of	a	fairer	future,	but	also	developing	a	more	fully	
fledged	social	diagnosis	of	problems	in	the	present.	
Notes 
	
1	Rhetorical	claims	about	passive	welfare	have	been	greatly	exaggerated;	given	that	the	receipt	of	
benefits	in	countries	with	highly	‘targeted’	income	support	policies	have	always	had	an	element	of	
conditionality	(Marston,	2008).	What	has	changed	in	the	past	two	decades,	in	Australia	and	the	UK,	is	
the	linking	of	conditionality	to	broadly	defined	‘activities’,	rather	than	to	a	specific	work	test.	
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